Canadian forces counter insurgency manual

Oh and by the way, here is the link to the U. Army the Canadian manual draws heavily from it….. A welcome email is on its way. If you don't see it, please check your junk folder. The next issue of Ottawa Citizen Headline News will soon be in your inbox. We encountered an issue signing you up. Leslie said. With additional reporting by Anthony Fenton in Vancouver. All rights reserved. Republish Print. The question of whether Canada handed over large numbers of Afghans - possibly innocents - to face abuse and torture is not just one of morality or law, but about making the mission a success.

So says the Canadian Forces' own manual on how a counterinsurgency campaign is conducted. The manual makes clear that counterinsurgency campaigns, like the one in Afghanistan, are not traditional wars, but political campaigns with a military component. Winning the hearts and minds of the population, offering a better alternative than insurgents, and claiming moral high ground are key.

History has shown that once the citizens have lost the confidence of the military forces engaged in the [counterinsurgency]operations, their sympathies and support will be transferred to the insurgents," the manual states.

The strategic onus to minimize civilian casualties rests squarely on counter-insurgents. Effective COIN thus contradicts the tactics by which Western states have preferred to fight their recent wars.

The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq altered this way of war by committing many Western states to the extensive use of ground forces for close combat and COIN operations, in which force protection was counterproductive for winning hearts and minds. This makes counterinsurgents less able to combat insurgents among the population, and suggests to the receiving populace that the counter-insurgents are unprepared to confront the same dangers the people have no choice but to face.

COIN doctrine thus requires re-balancing the risks borne by soldiers and civilians. Risk transfer from soldiers to civilians has been practiced for decades, but is neither a natural nor inevitable aspect of modern combat. Civilian casualties flow from policy preferences in predictable ways. This calculus does not — indeed, cannot — apply in COIN because the insurgent enemy is not easily distinguishable from the general population.

Precisely because the enemy can readily draw reinforcements and material support from the civilian population, is why securing public support is the primary objective.

This imposes numerous operational, legal and political challenges upon states fighting counter-insurgencies, and alters the assessment of which actions will likely contribute to strategic success. However, COIN doctrine is further complicated by the fact that success requires more than just tactical victory on the ground. It requires a popular perception that the intervening counter-insurgents are committed to defeating the insurgency over the long-term.

Since elected officials are often responsive to public pressure, and politicians, not generals, ultimately decide whether to sustain or abandon a military mission, maintaining domestic support is as equally important to the long-term prospects of success for a counter-insurgency as gaining local support.

Problematically, domestic support can be undermined by casualty-aversion in the general public. Although it is difficult to determine the effect of military casualties on democratic policy-making, casualties can awaken voters to the costs of a military engagement and incite resistance to the foreign deployment of troops, particularly if the mission is perceived as non-essential.